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CObjective: To examine cost responsiveness and total costs associated
with a simulated “value-based” insurance design for statin therapy in a
Medicare population with diabetes. Methods: Four-year panels were
constructed from the 1997-2005 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey
selected by self-report or claims-based diagnoses of diabetes in year 1
and use of statins in year 2 (N  899). We computed the number of
30-day statin prescription fills, out-of-pocket and third-party drug
costs, and Medicare Part A and Part B spending. Multivariate ordinary
least squares regression models predicted statin fills as a function of
out-of-pocket costs, and a generalized linear model with log link pre-
dicted Medicare spending as a function of number of fills, controlling
for baseline characteristics. Estimated coefficients were used to simu-
late changes in fills associated with co-payment caps from $25 to $1 O
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oi:10.1016/j.jval.2012.01.008nd to compute changes in third-party payments and Medicare cost
ffsets associated with incremental fills. Analyses were stratified by
atient cardiovascular event risk. Results: A simulated out-of-pocket
rice of $25 [$1] increased plan drug spending by $340 [$794] and gen-
rated Medicare Part A/B savings of $262 [$531]; savings for high-risk
atients were $558 [$1193], generating a net saving of $249 [$415].
onclusions: Reducing statin co-payments for Medicare beneficiaries
ith diabetes resulted in modestly increased use and reduced medical
pending. The value-based insurance design simulation strategy met
nancial feasibility criteria but only for higher-risk patients.
eywords: cost offsets, diabetes, Medicare, medication adherence.
opyright © 2012, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
utcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
Value-based insurance designs (VBID) have been proposed as a
means of slowing the dramatic rise in health care spending asso-
ciated with the treatment of chronic health conditions [1,2]. VBID
ncorporates financial incentives into prescription drug or other
nsurance benefits to encourage the initiation of, and adherence
o, prevention and treatment regimens for which higher utiliza-
ion levels are expected to yield clinical benefits that will, in turn,
enerate downstream savings in the medical care budget. The
ypes of financial incentives that have been suggested include the
eduction or complete elimination of cost-sharing, as well as in-
entives or rewards for high levels of adherence [3].
Evaluating the success of a VBID strategy depends on the per-
pective taken in the analysis. The societal perspective focuses on
he net change in total spending associated with changes in both
edication use and spending on other medical care. It may also
ncorporate the value of any incremental survival or improvement
n quality of life associated with increased medication use. How-
ver, given that most health insurance is provided through either
* Address correspondence to: Jennifer Lloyd, Doctoral Program in G
. Redwood Street, Howard Hall, Suite 200, Baltimore, MD 21201.
E-mail: jlloyd@epi.umaryland.edu.
098-3015/$36.00 – see front matter Copyright © 2012, Internation
ublished by Elsevier Inc.rivate markets or public programs with budget constraints, it
ay be more useful to consider the perspective of the third-party
ayer. This perspective limits the focus to direct spending and in
articular spending by the payer.
Figure 1 illustrates the hypothetical process through which
BID functions. Starting in the upper right, the application of VBID
educes patient cost-sharing for the targeted medication, shifting
ore of the payment to the third-party payer. Assuming price
esponsiveness, this reduced out-of-pocket (OOP) price will in-
rease medication use at the margin (upper left). The combination
f increased medication use and increased share of payment for
ll medications (not just the marginal medication use) results in a
et increase in third-party spending on medications (lower left).
ith appropriate targeting, the increased use of medications is
resumed to improve health status and reduce the need for med-
cal care services and spending. If the savings in medical spending
o third parties are larger than the increase in spending on medi-
ations, then VBID is a desirable strategy.
The success of a VBID strategy depends on the magnitude of
wo key relationships—the behavioral responsiveness of medica-
tology, University of Maryland, Baltimore & Baltimore County, 660
ciety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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405V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 4 0 4 – 4 1 1tion use to OOP price and the relationship between medication use
and health outcomes that affect medical care spending. VBID may
be applied universally—in other words, to all patients for whom a
drug might be indicated, or selectively to targeted subgroups of
patients most likely to benefit clinically or to respond more readily
to benefit design incentives. As the ability to target the benefit
structure increases, the larger are the cost savings likely to accrue
to the insurer.
Treatments for patients with diabetes have become a focus for
VBID inquiries because of the evidence of cost savings associated
with appropriate medication use. The use of statins to prevent or
delay the secondary complications of diabetes has been shown to
improve clinical outcomes for older adults [4–7]. There is also in-
creasing evidence that improved adherence to this class of medi-
cations reduces medical costs [8–15]. In a recent observational
study that included a variety of controls for confounding, Stuart et
al. [16] identified a savings of $832 associated with 10% higher
adherence to statins when measured over a 3-year period.
If improved medication adherence is cost-saving, the question
is whether patients are sufficiently responsive to OOP price
changes such that reduced co-payments can motivate a suffi-
ciently large increase in medication use. The price elasticity of
demand associated with cost-sharing and prescription drug ex-
penditures for the management of chronic conditions generally
ranges between 0.2 and 0.6 [17,18], depending on the study
esign, drug, and population. This indicates that a 10% decrease in
OP spending is associated with a 2% to 6% increase in spending
n prescription drugs. Several studies have focused on antidia-
etic medications, finding changes in co-payments to be associ-
ted with changes in medication use [19–21]. Goldman et al. [22]
ound a 25% reduction in days supplied of antidiabetic medica-
ions when co-payments were doubled. Some studies have exam-
ned the response to increases in OOP prices. For example, a lon-
itudinal study of statin users found that a 100% co-payment
ncrease resulted in reduced statin adherence rates of 2.6% and
.1% for new and continuing users, respectively [23]. In contrast, a
0% reduction in co-payments from a large employer resulted in a
.4% increased utilization of statins [24]. In general, Medicare ben-
ficiaries purchasing maintenance medications used for the long-
erm treatment of chronic conditions have been found to have a
ow level of response to cost-sharing incentives [18]. Chernew et
l. [24] reported price elasticities for diabetic drugs (0.136) and
statins (0.182)—estimates that were at the lower end of the range
previously reported for medications in patients with other chronic
conditions.
There have been several types of studies focused on demon-
strating the potential for VBID interventions. An early study by
Rosen et al. [25] used a Markov model to simulate how the elimi-
nation of cost-sharing would increase drug use in diabetic pa-
Improvement in health status 
Reduction in medical care use 
Increase total 
3rd party drug 
spending
+
Reduction in 3rd
party medical 
care spending 
= Net change in 3
rd
party spending 
Increase in
drug use 
Reduction in patient cost 
sharing, shift to 3rd party 
Fig. 1 – Value-based insurance design at the margin, third
party perspective.tients, reduce disease progression, and ultimately reduce medicalcare utilization and spending. However, the estimates used to
populate various nodes in the model were taken from the litera-
ture and may not have been specific to the study sample or envi-
ronment. Other studies have drawn on VBID interventions, prin-
cipally observational studies or small convenience samples where
single employers, such as Pitney Bowes, implemented a VBID pro-
gram change [26]. Some more recent studies have included com-
parison groups [27–29], with results pending for two prospective
controlled trials [30,31]. To date, there is evidence that VBID-re-
lated reductions in cost-sharing result in small but statistically
significant increases in medication use. No studies, however, have
demonstrated medical cost offsets to the increased cost borne by
the insurer. Furthermore, these studies examine the effects of
VBID in employee populations but have not yet addressed the po-
tential for VBID in the Medicare population.
In this study, we explored the potential cost-savings associated
with a simulated VBID strategy related to statin adherence for an
elderly population with diabetes. Extending prior research exam-
ining medical cost-savings associated with statin adherence [16],
we used a sample of Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes selected
from the nationally representative Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey (MCBS), following them for up to 3 years after baseline
assessment. We estimated multivariate models of demand for st-
atins as a function of the OOP price and then estimated the rela-
tionship between statin fills and Medicare spending. We used
microsimulation to assess the total and Medicare cost-saving po-
tential associated with reductions in cost-sharing for statins. We
also stratified our estimates by using a modified application of the
Framingham Risk Calculator as a way to examine the role of tar-
geting.
Methods
Data and study sample
Data from the 1997–2005 MCBS were used for this study. The MCBS
enrolls approximately 4000 Medicare beneficiaries every year and
follows these individuals for up to 3 additional years. Data col-
lected from this survey include self-reports of demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics, health and functional status, as
well as utilization and cost of all health services including pre-
scription drugs [32]. Information about prescription drug use is
provided by the respondent who is asked to keep a log of phar-
macy receipts, insurance claims, and used medication containers.
Each prescription fill or refill is recorded as a separate event and
includes information about the drug name, strength, and quantity
of doses. The date of the prescription fill and the number of days of
treatment supplied are not recorded. The MCBS is linked to Medi-
care administrative data including Part A and B claims.
Six pooled panels were constructed of beneficiaries inducted
into the MCBS from 1997 to 2002, who had a diagnosis of diabetes
in their baseline year. Identification of diabetes cases was based on
claims and self-report. An algorithm developed by the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services for the Chronic Condition Ware-
house was used to identify diabetes cases from claims [33]. The
Chronic Condition Warehouse criteria for diabetes include bene-
ficiaries with an International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revi-
sion, code for 250.xx (diabetes), 357.2 (polyneuropathy in diabetes),
362.01 (background diabetic retinopathy), 362.02 (proliferative di-
abetic retinopathy not otherwise specified), or 366.41 (diabetic cat-
aract) on one or more inpatient hospital, skilled nursing facility, or
home health claims or two outpatient hospital or physician claims
in any position [33]. Patients who reported being given a diagnosis
of diabetes by a physician were also included as cases. Self-re-
ported diabetes is considered the gold standard for identifying
individuals when clinical indicators are not available [34,35].
406 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 4 0 4 – 4 1 1Individuals excluded from the sample included 1) beneficiaries
living in long-term care (LTC) facilities during their baseline year,
although beneficiaries who were admitted to an LTC in subse-
quent years were retained, and 2) beneficiaries enrolled in capi-
tated Medicare health plans at any time during participation in the
MCBS, as well as dual eligibles who have both Medicaid and Medi-
care. Individuals in LTC were excluded because of differences in
the way the MCBS is administered in these settings. Individuals
enrolled in capitated Medicare health plans do not have Part A and
B claims, which were necessary in determining Medicare costs.
Last, dual eligibles were excluded because they were found to be
disproportionately represented among the higher-risk group and
they faced minimal OOP prices.
There were 2949 beneficiaries who had diabetes during their
baseline year. Among those, the final sample comprised a cohort
of individuals who reported filling prescriptions for statins during
their first full year in the MCBS following their fall induction sur-
vey (N  899). This drug user cohort was then followed until they
completed their MCBS participation or were lost to follow-up, ad-
mitted to an LTC facility for a long-term stay, or died; the final
observation year was 2005.
Measures
We had two dependent variables in the multivariate models—the
number of 30-day statin fills and Medicare expenditures for Part A
and Part B services. Statin prescription fills were determined by
drug names and therapeutic class indicators. Although days sup-
ply of prescription fills is not available in the MCBS, pill counts are
available and were used to measure drug use for each subject.
About 16% of medication fills were missing pill counts; these val-
ues were imputed on the basis of information in a beneficiary’s
medication regime by using a two-stage imputation procedure.
We divided the number of pills in each fill by 30 to calculate the
number of standardized 30-pill fills. Because most statins are
dosed once daily, this measure should accurately distinguish the
number of monthly fills, with 36 expected to be the maximum over
a 3-year period. Medicare expenditures for Part A and Part B ser-
vices were measured over the same time frame as the statin fills
measure. To account for inflation, all dollar values were converted
to constant 2005 dollars by using the consumer price index [36].
The key independent variable of interest in the statin fill de-
mand model was the OOP price per fill. To measure this, we
summed the OOP payments by beneficiaries associated with statin
fills in the base year and divided by the number of 30-pill fills in
that year. Ideally, we would have an exogenous price measure, not
based on observed prices. Because our question relates to VBID
among users of statins, however, the observed OOP price should
reflect the price faced at the margin for these users. In the cost-
offset model, the key independent variable of interest was the
number of statin fills. We did not include the OOP price in the
models, but we included indicators for supplemental medical and
drug benefits by source of coverage, because these would be ex-
pected to have independent effects on medical spending.
There were a number of covariates used in our regression mod-
els to control for confounding. These included demographic char-
acteristics such as age, sex, race, marital status, education,
income, and census region, which are believed to influence med-
ication use and Medicare spending. A number of health status and
disease severity variables were used to avoid indication bias. Self-
reported measures used included overall health, height, and
weight, which were used to compute body mass index (BMI), num-
ber of limitations in activities of daily living, and diabetes type.
Medicare administrative data provided variables to identify cur-
rent and former recipients of Social Security Disability Insurance.
Lastly, Medicare claims were used to create measures of diabetes
complications (International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision,
codes 250.1x to 250.9x) and various common comorbidities, in-cluding chronic renal failure, hypertension, ischemic heart dis-
ease, cardiac failure, hyperlipidemia, chronic obstructive pulmo-
nary disease, and osteoarthritis, plus a count of hierarchical
coexisting conditions. Finally, we included the number of days
followed in the community and dummy variables to capture the
reason for any censoring (loss to follow-up, LTC admission, death),
as well as year of induction into the MCBS (a proxy for temporal
trends in diabetes and availability of treatment options), and a
dummy variable that indicated whether the diabetes case was
identified by self-report only. Except for the spending, drug utili-
zation, and censoring variables, all covariates were measured dur-
ing the baseline year.
The analysis was conducted for the full cohort of diabetes pa-
tients and then stratified according to 10-year risk of a cardiovas-
cular event (stroke, acute myocardial infarction). The risk stratifi-
cation used a variant of the Framingham Risk Calculator (based on
the Simple Model with Office-Based non-Laboratory Predictors),
which assigns points on the basis of the following risk factors: age,
BMI, systolic blood pressure (SBP) (untreated and treated), smok-
ing status, and diabetes status [37]. Variables from the MCBS used
to create higher- and lower-risk groups included self-reported age,
gender, BMI (based on height and weight), current smoking status,
and diabetes status as well as claims-based measures of diabetes
and hypertension. Because the MCBS does not record SBP mea-
sures, it was assumed that individuals with hypertension (70% of
the sample) had an untreated SBP of 140 mm Hg. Individuals with-
out hypertension were assumed to have a treated SBP of 120 mm
Hg. Points for each item were summed to create a risk score for
each beneficiary. According to the Framingham Web site, all par-
ticipants in this sample were above a 30% 10-year risk of a cardio-
vascular event. The distribution of risk factor scores was exam-
ined by gender and a cut point for the higher-risk group was
determined (risk score  21 for men and risk score  24 for
women), leaving about 40% of the sample in the higher-risk group
(n  350) and 60% in the lower-risk group (n  549). This cut point
was used to stratify the analysis to determine whether higher-risk
individuals were more price responsive to OOP prices for statins
and to see whether higher-risk individuals had larger cost-offsets
associated with statin use than did lower-risk individuals.
Table 1 – Mean values for dependent variables and OOP
price, for full sample and by CVD risk.
Full cohort
(N  899)
By CVD risk
High risk
(n  350)
Low risk
(n  549)
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Medicare Part A
and Part B
spending,
cumulative
3 y (2005$)
36,690 1653 40,041 2840 34,553 2010
Statin fills,
cumulative
3 y, 30 d
24.4 0.4 25.5 0.7 23.7 0.5
First-year OOP
spending per
statin fill ($)
28.8 1.0 26.8 1.6 30.0 1.4
Source. Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 1997–2005.
CVD, cardiovascular disease; high risk, high risk for cardiovascular
event; low risk, low risk for cardiovascular event; SE, standard error
of the mean; OOP, out-of-pocket.
407V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 4 0 4 – 4 1 1Table 2 – Characteristics of sample cohort: Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes and baseline statin use.
Full cohort
(N  899)
By CVD risk
High risk
(n  350)
Low risk
(n  549)
Mean or % SE Mean or % SE Mean or % SE
Count of other drugs used (mean) 8.6 0.2 9.1 0.3 8.2 0.2
Supplemental medical insurance only (%) 19.8 1.3 18.0 2.1 20.9 1.7
Supplemental medical and prescription insurance (%) (not mutually exclusive)
Employer plan 51.6 1.7 51.4 2.7 51.7 2.1
Other private 2.0 0.5 2.3 0.8 1.8 0.6
Other public 8.6 0.9 10.0 1.6 7.7 1.1
Self-purchased 15.7 1.2 15.1 1.9 16.0 1.6
No supplemental medical or prescription insurance (%) 7.9 0.9 9.1 1.5 7.1 1.1
Age (y) (%)
65 (SSDI) 9.0 1.0 12.9 1.8 6.6 1.1
65–69 27.8 1.5 31.1 2.5 25.7 1.9
70–74 22.1 1.4 26.6 2.4 19.3 1.7
75–79 20.8 1.4 18.0 2.1 22.6 1.8
80 20.2 1.3 11.4 1.7 25.9 1.9
65 (former SSDI) 18.8 1.3 25.4 2.3 14.6 1.5
Females (%) 47.8 1.7 46.9 2.7 48.5 2.1
Race
Non-Hispanic white 84.1 1.2 80.3 2.1 86.5 1.5
Non-Hispanic black 9.0 1.0 12.9 1.8 6.6 1.1
Hispanic 4.1 0.7 2.9 0.9 4.9 0.9
Other 2.8 0.5 4.0 1.0 2.0 0.6
Marital status (%)
Married 64.3 1.6 63.1 2.6 65.0 2.0
Widowed 9.6 1.0 12.0 1.7 8.0 1.2
Single 26.1 1.5 24.9 2.3 27.0 1.9
Education (%)
No high school 12.9 1.1 13.7 1.8 12.4 1.4
Some high school 16.5 1.2 15.4 1.9 17.1 1.6
High school graduate 32.9 1.6 34.3 2.5 32.1 2.0
Some higher education 37.5 1.6 36.3 2.6 38.3 2.1
Annual income (%)
100% FPL 7.5 0.9 8.0 1.5 7.1 1.1
101%–199% FPL 32.6 1.6 34.9 2.6 31.1 2.0
200%–299% FPL 26.4 1.5 26.0 2.3 26.6 1.9
300% FPL 33.4 1.6 30.9 2.5 35.0 2.0
Census region (%)
East 20.9 1.4 20.3 2.2 21.3 1.7
Midwest 26.7 1.5 29.1 2.4 25.1 1.9
South 39.5 1.6 40.3 2.6 39.0 2.1
West 12.9 1.1 10.3 1.6 14.6 1.5
Diabetes type (%)
Type 1 10.5 1.0 12.6 1.8 9.1 1.2
Type 2 83.0 1.4 81.5 2.3 83.9 1.8
Self-report health status (%)
Excellent/very good 25.8 1.5 18.0 2.1 30.8 2.0
Good 34.3 1.6 37.1 2.6 32.4 2.0
Fair 27.8 1.5 31.1 2.5 25.7 1.9
Poor 12.0 1.1 13.7 1.8 10.9 1.3
Body mass index (%)
18.5 (underweight) 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
18.5–24.9 (normal) 20.1 1.3 5.1 1.2 29.7 2.0
25.0–29.9 (overweight) 40.3 1.6 10.3 1.6 59.4 2.1
30.0–34.9 (obese 1) 24.4 1.4 56.0 2.7 4.2 0.9
35.0–39.9 (obese 2) 9.6 1.0 20.9 2.2 2.4 0.6
40.0 (obese 3) 2.8 0.5 6.6 1.3 0.4 0.3
Comorbidities (%)
Diabetes complications 23.6 1.4 26.0 2.3 22.0 1.8
Chronic kidney disease 5.2 0.7 6.9 1.4 4.2 0.9(continued on next page)
e.
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We used bivariate analyses and multivariate regressions to exam-
ine the relationship between the OOP price and the cumulative
number of statin fills in the demand model, and in the cost offset
model, we estimated the effect of the cumulative number of st-
atins fills on cumulative Medicare Part A and Part B spending. The
statin demand model was estimated by using ordinary least
squares regression, and the cost offset model was a generalized
linear model with a gamma distribution and log link to approxi-
mate the right skewed distribution of Medicare costs. Because vir-
tually all subjects had some Medicare spending over the 3-year
observation period, we estimated one-part models, replacing the
small number of zero observations with a value of $1.
To simulate the effects of a VBID, we first generated a deter-
ministic prediction for our dependent variables, based on the ob-
served OOP price and all other variables. Then, we capped the OOP
price at various levels, and generated a predicted value for the
number of statin fills. We computed total and plan prescription
drug spending, assuming that the total spending per standard fill
did not change, but that for some users, the number of fills would
increase and the spending per fill would shift from the user to the
drug plan. The predicted number of fills was then substituted into
the cost offset model and a new Medicare Part A and Part B spend-
ing value was generated. We computed the change in predicted
statin fills from baseline by using the simulated OOP prices. Sim-
ilarly, we computed the change in plan drug spending and Medi-
care Part A and Part B spending associated with the simulated OOP
prices. The predictions used the observed values for each individ-
ual, with the exception of the OOP price. This approach differs
from the more common practice of generating predictions by us-
Table 2 (continued)
Hypertension
Ischemic heart disease
Congestive heart failure
Hyperlipidemia
COPD
Osteoarthritis
Cognitive impairment (%)
Psychiatric conditions (%)
ADL limitations (mean)
Current smoker (%)
MCBS induction year (%)
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Community months (mean)
Died during follow-up (%)
Entered LTC facility (%)
Lost to follow-up (%)
Self-reported diabetes only (%)
Source. Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 1997–2005.
ADL, activities of daily living; COPD, chronic obstructive pulmonary d
event; FPL, Federal Poverty Level; LTC, long-term care; low risk, low ris
standard error of the mean; SSDI, Social Security Disability Insurancing sample means and permits us to examine heterogeneity in themagnitude of response. Analyses used SAS (9.2) or Stata (version
10). The study protocol was approved by the University of Mary-
land Baltimore Institutional Review Board.
Results
Descriptive findings
The sample included 899 Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes
who used statins during their baseline year, with 350 identified as
higher-risk patients. Table 1 and Table 2 report sample means and
proportions for the dependent and independent measures respec-
tively, overall and stratified by risk status. Overall, patients filled
an average of 24.4 out of a maximum 36 fills, with a slightly higher
value among higher-risk patients (25.5 compared with 23.7 fills
among the lower-risk patients). Mean cumulative medical spend-
ing over the 3-year observation period was $36,690, with higher
spending among the higher-risk group ($40,041) than among the
lower-risk group ($34,553). Table 3 reports results from the ordi-
nary least squares regressions of the OOP price on the number of
statin fills, overall and stratified by risk status. For each dollar
increase in the OOP price, there is a reduction of 0.086 statin fills
(P  0.0001); the estimated elasticity is 0.101. The estimated ef-
fects are somewhat larger for the higher-risk than for the lower-
risk group, with elasticity estimates of0.111 and0.089, respec-
tively. The full set of regression coefficients is provided in
Appendix Table 1 in Supplemental Materials found at doi: 10.1016/
j.jval.2012.01.008. Although the models overall are highly signifi-
cant, relatively few individual variables are significant. Increasing
Full cohort
(N  899)
By CVD risk
High risk
(n  350)
Low risk
(n  549)
Mean or % SE Mean or % SE Mean or % SE
70.3 1.5 80.0 2.1 64.1 2.0
53.2 1.7 50.3 2.7 55.0 2.1
24.1 1.4 30.0 2.5 20.4 1.7
75.1 1.4 71.7 2.4 77.2 1.8
10.8 1.0 14.3 1.9 8.6 1.2
14.0 1.2 16.3 2.0 12.6 1.4
10.7 1.0 12.6 1.8 9.5 1.3
7.8 0.9 10.0 1.6 6.4 1.0
0.8 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.7 0.1
9.7 1.0 24.9 2.3 0.0 0.0
10.2 1.0 8.0 1.5 11.7 1.4
12.1 1.1 10.3 1.6 13.3 1.5
15.8 1.2 14.6 1.9 16.6 1.6
17.4 1.3 19.1 2.1 16.2 1.6
19.9 1.3 22.3 2.2 18.4 1.7
24.6 1.4 25.7 2.3 23.9 1.8
32.3 0.3 32.4 0.5 32.2 0.4
10.2 1.0 13.1 1.8 8.4 1.2
3.7 0.6 4.9 1.2 2.9 0.7
10.8 1.0 6.6 1.3 13.5 1.5
8.5 0.9 7.4 1.4 9.1 1.2
e; CVD, cardiovascular disease; high risk, high risk for cardiovascular
ardiovascular event; MCBS, Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey; SE,iseas
k for ceducation levels are associated with increased fills, while the pres-
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409V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 4 0 4 – 4 1 1ence of diabetes complications is associated with lower adher-
ence, suggesting that lower adherence in the past may be associ-
ated with the development of diabetes complications.
Table 4 reports results from the multivariate regressions of
statin fills on Medicare spending. Overall, the estimated effect of
an additional 30-pill fill is a reduction of $159.57 (P 0.03) in Medi-
care spending. For the higher-risk patients, the estimated effect is
almost double, at $279.54 (P  0.01) while the estimated effect for
he lower-risk patients is smaller ($97.47, P  0.29) and not signif-
icantly different than zero. The full set of regression coefficients is
reported in Appendix Table 2 in Supplemental Materials found at
doi: 10.1016/j.jval.2012.01.008.
The simulated effects of VBID are illustrated in Figure 2. Figure
2A shows the simulated effects of capping the OOP price at various
levels on changes in third-party payer spending on statins. For
example, relative to the baseline prediction of $1280, third-party
spending on statins increased by $340 when the OOP price was
capped at $25 and by $794 when the OOP price was capped at $1.
Estimates vary slightly by risk status. Figure 2B illustrates the ef-
ects of VBID on changes in Medicare Part A and Part B spending.
or the overall sample, the implementation of VBID pricing re-
uced Medicare spending by $262 (price cap at $25) to $531 (price
ap at $1). The effect for the higher-risk subgroup was substan-
ially higher, ranging from a reduction of $558 to $1193. The net
ffect of changes in third-party spending in these two categories is
llustrated in Figure 2C. Overall, the reduction in the OOP price
ssociated with VBID generated a net increase in third-party
pending, beginning with the $25 cap and increasing as the OOP
rice cap diminished. The net effect was a savings to third-party
ayers for the higher-risk group, ranging from $249 to $415 across
he various price caps. For the lower-risk groups, the results were
nverted, with net increases in third-party spending as price caps
ere lowered.
Discussion
The results of this study provide the first empirical evidence
that a VBID strategy may be effective within the Medicare pop-
ulation, and in particular, demonstrate that its selective appli-
cation could deliver net savings to the Medicare program [38].
Previous studies have reported on changes in drug use associ-
ated with cost-sharing, while others have reported on reduced
medical costs associated with medication adherence. In this
Table 3 – Estimated effects of the OOP price per fill on cum
Cohort N Mean OOP price ($) Mean fills (N)
Overall 899 28.77 24.41
High risk 350 26.81 25.50
Low risk 549 30.02 23.72
Source. Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 1997–2005.
high risk, high risk for cardiovascular event; low risk, low risk for car
Table 4 – Estimated effects of statin fills on 3-y cumulative
Mean
fills (N)
Medicare Par
Part B spend
Overall 899 24.41 36,690
High risk 350 25.50 40,041
Low risk 549 23.72 34,553
Source. Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 1997–2005.
high risk, high risk for cardiovascular event; low risk, low risk for cardiovastudy, we integrated the two components and simulated the net
effects from the perspective of Medicare as a third-party payer.
Our simulated cost offsets were substantial for the higher-risk
subgroup, with a net savings of $415 per patient associated with
a $1 co-payment, but did not yield net offsets for the group of
diabetes patients overall. These findings suggest that a VBID
strategy may be very attractive within the Medicare program if
it is feasible to target the benefit. Further research, however,
including intervention studies, to confirm the response and net
costs of a VBID strategy of this type is warranted.
Within the current structure of the Medicare Part D system,
managed care prescription drug plans (MA-PDPs) would have the
capacity to benefit from any net savings in medical expenditures,
because the medical and prescription drug benefits are integrated.
The introduction of VBID for MA-PDPs would clearly present a
competitive advantage for these types of plans over their stand-
alone Part D plan counterparts. That said, reducing cost-sharing
for the sickest enrollees may also lead to adverse risk selection,
with the sickest beneficiaries favoring MA-PDPs offering it. In ad-
dition, some MA-PDPs may balk at introducing such mechanisms
where it is not possible to ensure that targeted beneficiaries will
remain in the MA-PDP for sufficient time for the plan to benefit
from the downstream offsets.
While the logistics of implementing VBID for MA-PDP enroll-
ees may be relatively straightforward, applying VBID mecha-
nisms to other types of drug coverage may be more complex.
Downstream savings in medical care costs reaped by the Medi-
care fee-for-service program clearly present no incentive for
ex-ante increases in coverage by stand-alone PDPs under Part D.
Other mechanisms would need to be devised to provide the
necessary incentives to reduce co-payments, for example, in-
creased levels of federal subsidy to Part D plans to cover the
additional plan costs for targeted beneficiaries. Employer spon-
sored plans that receive the retiree drug subsidy could be fur-
ther subsidized for implementing a VBID cost-sharing structure,
and the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program could easily
adopt these changes as well.
Targeting VBID incentives to higher-risk beneficiaries presents
a number of important logistical issues that would need to be
addressed, such as how patients are designated as eligible and
how the alternative co-payment structure is implemented at the
time prescriptions are filled [39]. In addition, targeting VBID co-
payment reductions may generate perceptions of inequity be-
ve 3-y statin fills.
fficient SE P  |z| Price elasticity Model R2
0.086 0.015 0.000 0.101 0.317
0.106 0.023 0.000 0.111 0.455
0.070 0.019 0.000 0.089 0.298
scular event; SE, standard error of the mean; OOP, out-of-pocket.
icare spending.
nd
($)
Marginal effect
incremental fill
SE P  |z|
159.57 73.24 0.03
279.54 111.66 0.01
97.47 91.56 0.29ulati
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410 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 4 0 4 – 4 1 1cause individual patients are charged different co-payments for
the same medications. Concerns about inequity may be dispelled
if insurers emphasize the role of clinical need in targeting the
benefit. Of potentially greater concern is that targeting by clinical
status could potentially create perverse incentives. It could, for
example, discourage some individuals from attempting to lose
weight or quit smoking if they thought it could lead to the loss of
their preferred VBID status.
While our example demonstrates the feasibility of a VBID strat-
egy, the study is subject to limitations. The study period for our data
ended in 2005. While behavioral responses to price changes are un-
likely to vary, and the clinical impacts and medical cost-savings may
not have changed dramatically, the costs of statin therapies for Medi-
care beneficiaries have changed as a result of patent expirations, and
perhaps more importantly, following the introduction of Medicare
Part D in 2006. Hence, it is important to consider how changes in
market price—both total and OOP—affect the VBID calculus. In our
analysis, we used observed OOP payments and applied successively
generous caps. The observed payments reflected the range of prices
over the study period and should have captured reductions in the
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Fig. 2 – Simulated effects of VBID OOP price of standardized
statin fill caps on Medicare beneficiaries. High risk, high
risk for cardiovascular event; low risk, low risk for
cardiovascular event; OOP, out-of-pocket; VBID, value-
based insurance design.price of statins associated with generic competition starting in 2002. uAs generic drugs tend to be subject to even lower co-payments in
more recent years—either through tiered formularies or through the
pricing policies of big-box stores such as Walmart—a VBID strategy
would have to reduce OOP prices even further to elicit increased use.
On the other hand, the third-party payer would then be at risk for
only a smaller increase in its share of the total drug costs while the
downstream savings in medical spending should remain unaffected.
Hence, our results may overstate the increased cost to insurers to
participate in a VBID strategy and understate the net savings in med-
ical care costs.
The study is observational, and the estimates of price re-
sponse and medical care offsets are based on cross-sectional
and temporal variation. Despite extensive controls for con-
founding in the multivariate models, there is the potential for
bias associated with unobserved health or behavioral factors. In
addition, we note that our measures of drug use and spending
are not based on insurance claims, and hence may be subject to
reporting error. The estimated elasticity is a key element of the
simulation. Our elasticity estimates, in the range of about 0.1,
are even lower than those reported in the literature. To the
extent that they are biased downward, then our simulation pro-
vides a conservative measure of the net cost savings associated
with a VBID strategy. Finally, we did not attempt to model any
costs associated with the implementation, monitoring, and
evaluation of the VBID strategy in this simulation; identifying
low-cost methods to meet these program requirements is im-
portant to the feasibility of a VBID program.
The prevalence of diabetes in the Medicare population was
approximately 8.2 million in 2009, while forecasts suggest an in-
crease to almost 15 million by 2034, and an almost fourfold in-
crease in annual diabetes-related expenditure [40]. Nevertheless,
while statin therapy is recommended for most diabetic patients,
additional examples likely would be needed to justify the expense
of implementing a VBID approach. In a related study [16] examin-
ng medical care spending offsets associated with the use of oral
ntidiabetics and angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors or
ngiotensin receptor blockers in the same sample of diabetic pa-
ients, we failed to find parallel savings [41–43].
Of course, VBID focuses only on the net costs of increased med-
cation use—whether it is from the third-party or societal perspec-
ive. There is no attempt to value and incorporate any survival or
uality-of-life benefit from the patient perspective. In addition,
here may be benefits to employers related to reduced illness and
bsenteeism that our estimates cannot capture because they are
ocused on the insurer [44]. If these were to be included in the
alculus, many additional treatments might be identified as ap-
ropriate for VBID.
Finally, VBID can be used to increase the use of selected
herapies that are demonstrated to be both clinically effective
nd likely to lead to reduced medical care spending. It is impor-
ant, however, to recognize that VBID applies a higher standard
or the designated services than is currently applied in the
edicare program. Medicare currently covers some therapies
or which there is only limited empirical evidence, or evidence
f relatively modest clinical benefit, and Congress has been re-
uctant to mandate that new evidence generated through com-
arative effectiveness research be used to make coverage deci-
ions [45]. Instead of setting a uniquely high bar for VBID, a
etter strategy might be to reduce cost-sharing for effective ser-
ices, even without evidence of a medical cost offset. The in-
reased cost associated with higher use of those services could
e offset by limiting coverage or introducing a higher level of
ost-sharing for services that have evidence of limited benefit or
alue [46,47]. Services with a limited evidence base could be
overed only through an evidence development strategy, and
ltimately this would help to identify additional candidates for
[[
[
[
[
[
[
411V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 4 0 4 – 4 1 1VBID. The adoption of VBID may be the needed catalyst to ra-
tionalize the use of evidence in coverage decisions.
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